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Abstract/Zusammenfassung/Résumé 
This paper examines the impact of the activities of organized criminal groups on 
peacebuilding efforts in the cases of Kosovo and Liberia. For each of the two cases, the 
paper looks at the evolution of criminal patterns in the period before, during and after the 
conflict and examines their impact on peacebuilding in the post-conflict phase. The paper 
examines the period from the early 1990s to early 2006 for the case of Kosovo, and from 
early 1997 to early 2006 for the case of Liberia. It argues that although the types of 
organized crime differed widely in the two cases, organized crime presented a serious 
threat to peacebuilding efforts and damaged the functioning of democratic institutions. The 
two cases therefore offer good examples of how different types of organized crime can 
have equally devastating effect on peacebuilding. The paper reviews tools available to the 
international community to fight against organized crime and concludes by recommending 
that combating organized crime should be part of conflict prevention and conflict 
management efforts and thus be at the forefront of the international post-conflict 
peacebuilding agenda. It offers some recommendations to that effect. 
Das vorliegende Working Paper untersucht die Auswirkung der Aktivitäten organisierter 
krimineller Gruppierungen auf friedensfördernde Massnahmen im Kosovo und in Liberia. In 
beiden Fällen beleuchtet es die Entstehung krimineller Strukturen vor, während und nach 
dem Gewaltkonflikt, und deren Einfluss auf friedensfördernde Massnahmen in der 
Nachkriegsphase – im Falle Kosovos der Zeitraum zwischen den frühen 90er Jahren und 
Anfang 2006, für Liberia zwischen Anfang 1997 und Anfang 2006. Obwohl jeweils sehr 
unterschiedlich ausgeprägt, so wurde das organisierte Verbrechen in beiden Fällen zu einer 
ernsthaften Bedrohung für friedensfördernde Massnahmen und schadete der 
Handlungsfähigkeit demokratischer Institutionen. Die beiden Fälle zeigen eindrücklich, wie 
unterschiedliche Typen organisierten Verbrechens ähnlich zerstörerische Auswirkungen auf 
die Friedensförderung haben. Es werden weiterhin verschiedene Instrumentarien 
vorgestellt, die es der internationalen Gemeinschaft ermöglichen, organisiertem Verbrechen 
entgegenzutreten. Das Working Paper plädiert dafür, dass der Kampf gegen organisiertes 
Verbrechen ein integrales Element von Konfliktprävention und -bearbeitung, und damit 
Hauptanliegen internationaler Bemühungen um den Wiederaufbau von 
Nachkriegsgesellschaften sein sollte. Es werden einige konkrete Empfehlungen vorgestellt. 
Cet article examine l’impact des activités de groupes criminels organisés sur la 
consolidation de la paix dans les cas du Kosovo et du Liberia. Dans chacun des deux cas, 
l’article étudie l’évolution des pratiques criminelles dans la période d’avant, pendant et 
celle d’après le conflit, et examine leur impact sur la consolidation de la paix dans la 
période post-conflit. L’article couvre la période allant du début des années 1990 au début 
de 2006 pour le cas du Kosovo, et celle du début de 1997 au début de 2006 pour le cas du 
Liberia. Il soutient que même si les types de crime organisé étaient différents dans les deux 
cas, celui-ci a représenté une menace grave aux efforts de la consolidation de la paix sur la 
période considérée, et a affecté de manière négative le fonctionnement des institutions 
démocratiques. Par conséquent, les deux cas offrent de bons exemples des effets tout 
autant ravageurs que différents types de crime organisé peuvent avoir sur la consolidation 
de la paix. Sur la base des deux études de cas, l’article passe en revue des outils à la 
disposition de la communauté internationale pour combattre le crime organisé. En 
conclusion, l’article recommande que la lutte contre crime organisé soit partie intégrante de 
la prévention et de la gestion des conflits, et figure au premier rang des efforts déployés 
par la communauté internationale dans le domaine de la consolidation de la paix en 
période post-conflit. Il offre quelques recommendations à cet égard. 
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1 Introduction 
Building sustainable peace after the conflict has ended has become a major challenge for 
national, regional and international actors alike. This paper examines the impact of organized 
crime on peacebuilding efforts in the cases of Kosovo and Liberia. For the case of Kosovo, it 
looks at the period from the early 1990s to early 2006, and for Liberia at the period from early 
1997 to early 2006.  
This paper argues that organized crime represents a challenge to peace and stability before, 
during and after the conflict. It identifies sustainable, democratic state institutions as an 
essential requirement for building durable peace and argues that the activities of organized 
criminal groups severely weaken state institutions, undermining their effectiveness and 
legitimacy. Consequently, efforts to combat organized crime are essential to peacebuilding and 
should be deployed as early as possible, even before the conflict has ended. In other words, 
combating organized crime should be part of peacebuilding throughout the conflict continuum, 
i.e. from conflict prevention, conflict management, to post-conflict peacebuilding. 
The two cases were chosen as they differ from one another in terms of history, geography and 
issues at stake. However, they were both exposed, during the period under review, to the 
activities of organized crime. They were also subject to various measures against organized 
crime by the international community. Although not sufficiently representative to allow us to 
draw generally applicable conclusions, the two cases offer a good example of how criminal 
activities impact on peacebuilding, and which are among the possible tools to fight against 
them. 
The paper first defines the concepts of peacebuilding and organized crime. It then outlines the 
main activities of organized criminal groups for each of the two cases, and examines the ways 
in which these activities impacted on peacebuilding efforts. For each of the case studies, it 
looks at the evolution of criminal patterns in the period before, during and after the conflict, 
and examines how they impacted on peacebuilding in the post-conflict phase. The paper treats 
only the most prominent and prevalent types of organized crime. It then looks at international 
measures to combat organized crime in Kosovo and Liberia and concludes by drawing some 
lessons and offering some recommendations on the basis of these two case studies.
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2 Main Concepts and Definitions 
2.1 Peacebuilding 
The concept of peacebuilding was introduced in 1992 by Boutros Boutros-Ghali, then 
Secretary-General of the United Nations, in his "An Agenda for Peace". Boutros-Ghali, 
building on the work of Johan Galtung, conceived the concept of “post-conflict peace-
building” as “action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and 
solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.”1 This should encompass “rebuilding 
the institutions and infrastructures of nations torn by civil war and strife; and building bonds of 
peaceful mutual benefit among nations formerly at war” as well as “in the largest sense, to 
address the deepest causes of conflict: economic despair, social injustice and political 
oppression.”2 In his 1995 Supplement to an Agenda for Peace, the centrality of institution-
building was strengthened, and the goal of peacebuilding, which was no longer limited to 
post-conflict stage but could take place before, during or after a conflict, was defined as “the 
creation of structures for the institutionalization of peace.”3 
Throughout the 1990s, the concept of peacebuilding continued gaining more prominence in 
the academic discourse as well as in practice. The academic debate on the concept, goals, 
definition of success and legitimacy of peacebuilding became lively during the 1990s and has 
continued to the present day. The views have been divergent, from those claiming that the 
goals of peacebuilding should be to prevent a relapse into conflict and its success measured by 
the absence of war; to those setting more ambitious standards, such as the resolution of the 
root causes of conflict and the establishment of the “positive peace”; to others again taking 
the middle way. Some have questioned the very concept of peacebuilding built on the premise 
of “liberal peace” which presupposes that democracy and free market economy necessarily 
promote peace. This, they have argued, is tantamount to interventionism as it implies the 
promotion and imposition of Western values and institutions in vulnerable war-torn societies, 
and can, apart from the fact that it is morally questionable, lead to the opposite result. 
While the debate continued, the practice was evolving rapidly, with the establishment, in 
November 1997, of the first United Nations peacebuilding office, the Peace-building Office in 
Liberia (UNOL, 1997-2003). UNOL was mandated to support the Government of Liberia in its 
efforts to consolidate peace following the July 1997 multiparty elections, promote national 
reconciliation and good governance and strengthen democratic institutions.  
In 1998, the Security Council adopted a presidential statement in which it encouraged the 
Secretary-General “to explore the possibility of establishing post-conflict peace-building 
structures as part of efforts by the United Nations system to achieve a lasting peaceful solution 
to conflicts, including in order to ensure a smooth transition from peacekeeping to peace-
building and lasting peace.”4 The Security Council also recognized the value of including 
 
______________________ 
1 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping, New York: 
United Nations, 1992, para. 21. 
2 Ibid, para. 15. 
3  Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Supplement to an Agenda for Peace, Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the 
Organisation, A/50/60-S/1995/1, 3 January 1995. 
4 Statement by the President of the Security Council, S/PRST/1998/38, 29 December 1998. 
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peacebuilding elements in the mandates of peacekeeping operations, clearly making it a norm 
that peacebuilding is not an activity confined only to the post-conflict phase. 
The establishment of UNOL was followed by three other peacebuilding offices. In June 1999, 
the United Nations Peace-Building Support Office in Guinea-Bissau was created to help 
promote national reconciliation and assist with the establishment of conditions propitious for 
the conduct of legislative and presidential elections. Following the elections in early 2000, the 
mandate was revised to involve, among other tasks, support to national efforts to consolidate 
and maintain peace, democracy and the rule of law, including the strengthening of democratic 
institutions, and support to national efforts towards reconciliation.5 In February 2000, the 
United Nations Peacebuilding Office in Central African Republic was established, following the 
withdrawal of the peacekeeping mission from that country,6 with the mandate “to support the 
Government's efforts to consolidate peace and national reconciliation, strengthen democratic 
institutions and facilitate the mobilization at the international level, of political support and 
resources for national reconstruction and economic recovery.”7 Finally, in June 2000, the 
Security Council established the UN Tajikistan Office of Peacebuilding (UNTOP), mandated to 
provide the political framework for post-conflict peacebuilding activities of the UN system in 
that country. This included, among other tasks, efforts aimed at national reconstruction, 
economic recovery, poverty alleviation and good governance, and assistance in creating an 
enabling environment for consolidation of peace, democracy and the rule of law.8  
The tendency to put the building and strengthening of democratic institutions at the core of 
the peacebuilding tasks, featuring prominently in the mandates of peacebuilding support 
offices, was further reinforced in the 2001 Security Council's definition of peacebuilding.9 The 
Security Council also recognized the close interrelationship between peacemaking, 
peacekeeping and peacebuilding and reiterated its earlier assertion on the value of including 
peacebuilding elements in the mandates of peacekeeping operations. Finally, most recently, 
the Security Council, while establishing the Peacebuilding Commission, emphasized “the 
importance of supporting national efforts to establish, redevelop or reform institutions for 
effective administration of countries emerging from conflict, including capacity-building 
efforts.”10 
As it emerges from the above review, the strengthening of legitimate state institutions is 
considered an essential requirement for building durable peace and as such, central to all 
peacebuilding efforts. One of the essential tasks is therefore state capacity building, all the 
more so as state institutions play a crucial role in preventing violent conflict. This task is 
enormous and comprises various activities aimed at enabling state institutions to meet 
political, security and socio-economic needs of its population, including by upholding the rule 
of law and ensuring the respect for human rights. 
 
______________________ 
5  http://www.un.org/peace/africa/pdf/GuineaBissau.pdf.  
6  Letter dated 3 December from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council 
(S/1999/1235) and Letter dated 10 December from the President of the Security Council Addressed to the 
Secretary-General (S/1999/1236).  
7  http://www.un.org/peace/africa/pdf/CAR.pdf.  
8  http://www.untop.org/ 
9  Statement by the President of the Security Council, S/PRST/2001/5, 20 February 2001.  
10  Security Council Resolution, S/RES/1645/(2005), 20 December 2005. 
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2.2 Organized Crime 
There is currently no globally accepted definition of organized crime. The United Nations 
Convention on Transnational Organized Crime,11 which entered into force in September 2003, 
is to date the most important international legal instrument attempting to arrive at such a 
definition. 
The Convention, which is a legally binding document committing States that have ratified it to 
taking measures against transnational organized crime, applies to any "serious crime" defined 
as “conduct constituting an offence punishable by a maximum deprivation of liberty of at least 
four years or a more serious penalty” (Article 2(b)) if the offence is transnational in nature and 
involves an organized criminal group (Article 3.1(b)). An “organized criminal group” is defined 
as a “structured group of three or more persons, existing for a period of time and acting in 
concert with the aim of committing one or more crimes or offences established in accordance 
with this Convention, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material 
benefit (Article 2(a)). 
It also applies to the following offences: 
− Participation in the activities of an “organized criminal group” and “organizing, 
directing, aiding, abetting, facilitating or counseling the commission of serious crime 
involving an organized criminal group” (Article 5); 
− Participation in activities relating to "money laundering": this involves “the 
conversion or transfer of property, knowing that such property is the proceeds of 
crime” and includes any form of transfer or conversion of the property for the purpose 
of concealing its true origin (Article 6); 
− Corruption, where there is a link to transnational organized crime. This includes 
offering, giving, soliciting and accepting any form of bribe, undue advantage or other 
inducement, where the proposed recipient is a public official and the purpose of the 
bribe relates to his or her official functions (Article 8); 
− Any form of obstruction of justice, including the use of corrupt or coercive means 
(physical force, threats or intimidation) to influence testimony or interfere with the 
exercise of official duties by a justice or law enforcement official (Article 23). 
A separate convention on corruption, the United Nations Convention against Corruption, 
which was negotiated subsequently and aims at preventing and combating corruption, 
recently entered into force.12 
The Convention on Transnational Organized Crime is supplemented by three protocols. 
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and
 
______________________ 
11  General Assembly Resolution, A/RES/55/25, 8 January 2001, Annex I. 
12  General Assembly Resolution, A/RES/58/4, 21 November 2003, Annex. It entered into force in December 2005. 
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Children13 stipulates that “ ’[t]rafficking in persons’ shall mean the recruitment, transportation, 
transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms 
of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of 
vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a 
person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall 
include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual 
exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the 
removal of organs” (Article 3(a)). Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and 
Air14 defines “smuggling of migrants” as “[…] the procurement, in order to obtain, directly or 
indirectly, a financial or other material benefit, of the illegal entry of a person in to a State 
Party of which the person is not a national or permanent resident” (Article 3(a)). Finally, the 
Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and 
Components and Ammunition,15 the first legally binding instrument on small arms adopted at 
the global level, aims at promoting, facilitating and strengthening cooperation among States 
in preventing, combating and eradicating the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in 
firearms, their parts and components and ammunition. 
The United Nations conventions also regulate the use of narcotics. The following three 
conventions form the basis of the international drug control system, restricting the use of 
hundreds of psychoactive substances to medical and scientific use: the Single Convention on 
Narcotic Drugs (1961), the Convention on Psychotropic Substances (1971) and the Convention 
against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (1988). 
While examining the illegal activities of organized criminal groups in the cases of Kosovo and 
Liberia, this paper will use as a basis the above legal instruments and definitions contained 
therein. 
2.3 Peacebuilding and Organized Crime 
The link between peacebuilding and organized crime is explicitly made in several UN 
documents. In December 2004, the Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and 
Change clearly recognized the interrelatedness of transnational organized crime, conflict and 
peacebuilding, stating that “organized criminal activities undermine peacebuilding efforts and 
fuel many civil wars through illicit trade in conflict commodities and small arms”.16 The 2005 
World Summit Outcome Document also made reference to organized crime, expressing “grave 
concern” at its negative effects on development, peace and security and human rights, and 
reaffirming the resolve of the Member States to jointly work to combat this problem.17 
Importantly, the United Nations Chief Executives Board for Coordination (CEB), a forum that 
brings together the executive heads of all organizations of the United Nations system under
 
______________________ 
13  General Assembly Resolution, A/RES/55/25, 18 January 2001, Annex II. It entered into force in December 2003. 
14  General Assembly Resolution, A/RES/55/25, 18 January 2001, Annex III. It entered into force in January 2004. 
15  General Assembly Resolution, A/RES/55/255, 8 June 2001, Annex. It entered into force in July 2005. 
16  A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility. Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and 
Change, A/59/565, 2 December 2004. 
17  General Assembly Resolution, A/RES/60/1, 24 October 2005, para. 111. 
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the chairmanship of the Secretary-General, likewise recognized the impact of organized crime 
on the key areas of UN involvement, namely peace and security, social and economic 
development, human rights, democracy and good governance. In 2004, the Board addressed 
this item on the basis of a note prepared by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), 
entitled “Organized crime and corruption are threats to security and development: the role of 
the United Nations system.”18  
The note reviews the impact of transnational crime in three sectors: peace and security; 
development; and human rights and good governance. It clearly recognizes the negative 
impact organized crime has on peace and security, stating that “[o]rganised criminal groups 
established in periods of conflict delay, even subvert, the establishment of democratic 
institutions in the post-conflict phase. In most post-conflict situations, the growth of organized 
crime constitutes a challenge to the development of reformed national institutions, such as 
police, customs and the judiciary, as well as to economic reforms.”19 
As a follow-up, the Board endorsed a package of measures aimed at building an effective 
system-wide response to combating organized crime, and a Programme of Action that seeks to 
identify potential joint action within the UN system to curb transnational organized crime. 
As the above review has shown, the link between organized crime and peacebuilding is made 
in some of the UN documents. However, the documents governing peacebuilding support 
offices do not refer specifically to the threat of organized crime; neither does organized crime 
figure in the 2001 Security Council definition of peacebuilding. In these documents, the need 
for the fight against organized crime is generally vaguely captured under the wider notion of 
the promotion of transparent and accountable governance and the rule of law.  
The lack of a clear mandate to fight against organized crime in these documents does not, 
however, mean that the UN does not assign any attention to this matter in the context of 
peacebuilding in practice. Although only three of the current UN field presences are called 
peacebuilding support offices (the above-mentioned offices in Tajikistan, Guinea-Bissau and 
Central African Republic), there are other UN missions, be it special political missions or 
peacekeeping operations, with strong elements of peacebuilding, among them the current 
missions in Kosovo and Liberia. Some of these field presences do address the issues of 
organized crime. 
The following two sections will outline the main activities of organized criminal groups in 
Kosovo and Liberia, the impact of these activities on peacebuilding and the action taken by the 
international community to fight against organized crime. 
 
______________________ 
18  Summary of the conclusions of the United Nations Chief Executives Board for Coordination at its first regular 
session of 2004, Vienna, 2-3 April 2004, Chief Executives Board, CEB/2004/1, 3 May 2004, pp. 7-10. 
19  Organized Crime and Corruption are Threats to Security and Development: The Role of the United Nations 
System, UNODC, April 2004. 
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3 Kosovo 
3.1 Evolution of Criminal Patterns from the Early 1990s to Early 2006 
Background 
Several factors were crucial for development, expansion and consolidation of criminal 
networks in the Balkans. In Kosovo, the illegal economy became vital to the Kosovan Albanian 
population following Serbia’s revocation of the province’s autonomy in 1989. Kosovan 
Albanians not only lost administrative control of the Kosovo but were also dismissed from their 
jobs, denied access to state-run health care and deprived of education in their language. 
Politically, many mobilized and joined in their support for the moderate Democratic League of 
Kosova (LDK) of Ibrahim Rugova, while others chose to support the armed struggle of the 
Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). 
In 1999, in response to Serbia’s wide-scale attacks on the Albanian population in Kosovo, the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) carried out a series of air strikes on Yugoslav and 
Serbian security forces and paramilitary groups over a period of eleven weeks. The strikes were 
suspended on 9 June 1999, following the agreement of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to 
withdraw its forces from Kosovo. Under the cease-fire agreement, the 50,000 KLA guerillas 
were to disarm, disband and join the civil protection Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC). 
On 10 June 1999, The United Nations Security Council adopted a resolution establishing the 
United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK) in order to “provide transitional 
administration while establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic 
self-governing institutions.” The Security Council also created an international force composed 
of NATO troops (Kosovo Force – KFOR) to ensure “public safety and order until the 
international civil presence can take responsibility for this task.”20 
Activities of organized criminal groups from the early 1990s to early 200621 
One of the main activities undertaken by organized criminal groups before the violent conflict 
of 1998-99 was trafficking in drugs. Limited employment opportunities, which left the 
population reliant on remittances from their families abroad, and the province’s strategic 
location on the heroin trafficking route from Afghanistan to Europe, contributed in the early 
1990s to the Kosovars’ increasing involvement in organized crime. 
The Kosovars, taking advantage of their large expatriate communities located throughout 
Western Europe, were soon able to challenge the traditional Turkish dominance over the 
heroin markets. They also became important players in prostitution rings. The sanctions 
imposed on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1992 by the UN Security Council and the 
blockade enforced by Greece against Macedonia were additional factor that contributed to the  
 
______________________ 
20  Security Council Resolution, S/RES/1244 (1999), 10 June 1999. 
21  Serbia, part of which for the time being remains Kosovo, is party to the UN Convention on Transnational 
Organized Crime with the supplementing protocols, and the UN Convention Against Corruption. 
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expansion of criminal activities in the region, in particular the illegal trade in oil, arms and 
narcotics.22  
Smuggling channels in Kosovo that developed prior to the conflict 1998-99 were essential for 
Kosovo’s struggle for independence. The profits generated through illegal channels enabled 
the Kosovars, in particular the KLA, to equip themselves and confront a militarily superior 
adversary. In the meantime, disillusionment of the Kosovan Albanians with the peaceful 
resistance policy of “unofficial president” Ibrahim Rugova, especially after the Dayton Peace 
Agreement in 1995 did not address the Kosovo problem, made the population increasingly 
choose the armed struggle over the peaceful resistance.23 
The links between the heroin trade and the provision of weapons to the KLA are well 
documented. Drugs-for-guns trade is thought to have begun in the early 1990s, with 
shipments of weapons destined for Kosovo, financed with the proceeds from the heroin 
trade.24 The Montreal Gazette in 1999 claimed “the KLA got much of its funding from sales of 
heroin, and enjoyed intimate links with the Italian Mafia and Albanian heroin barons. […] The 
involvement was so great that the KLA played a part in feeding the heroin craze that [has] 
raged across Western Europe and North America during the 1990s.”25 The European police 
were reportedly suspicious about the correlation between the upsurge of the Kosovan 
Albanians in the heroin trade in some Western European countries and the sudden 
development of the KLA into a potent force.26 In 2000, Ralf Mutschke, an official of the 
Interpol Criminal Intelligence Directorate spoke about the intertwining of political and criminal 
activities. He noted that the Albanian drug lords started to financially contribute to the 
“national cause” as early as in 1980s. These funds were largely used for the arms and military 
equipment of the KLA after its emergence in 1993.27  
By 1997, the KLA had developed into a well-equipped guerrilla army and reportedly entirely 
controlled the heroin trade through Kosovo. The collapse of the pyramid schemes in 
neighboring Albania in 1997 and the ensuing looting of arms depots, most of which was sold 
to the KLA, gave a huge impetus to the KLA’s heroin-for-arms trade. By 1998, the KLA was 
considered to be an essential actor in the drugs-for-arms trade, assisting in the provision of 2 
billion USD worth of drugs per year to the Western Europe.28 In 1999, Interpol reported that 40  
 
______________________ 
22  Lawless Rule Versus Rule of Law in the Balkans, Special Report 97, United States Institute of Peace, December 
2002; Corruption, Contraband and Organized Crime in Southeast Europe, Center for the Study of Democracy, 
Sofia, 2003.  
23  Marko Hajdinjak, Smuggling in Southeast Europe: The Yugoslav Wars and the Development of Regional Criminal 
Networks in the Balkans, Center for the Study of Democracy, 2002, p. 12. 
24  Lawless Rule Versus Rule of Law in the Balkans. 
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percent of the heroin that reached Western Europe (Switzerland, Germany and the 
Scandinavian countries) had come from Kosovo.29 
An important source of the KLA financing before and during the conflict were fundraising 
activities of the Kosovan diaspora, which were allegedly also being used to launder money 
originating from drug trade. Various sources reported on the large amounts of money being 
raised through KLA fundraising in the United States and in Europe, and claimed that large 
portions of it seemed to be illegal drug money. Some claimed that narcotics money was being 
laundered in banks in Turkey and Western Europe, in exchange for large commissions. There 
were also reports of money being laundered in Albania, with the involvement of the Kosovars 
that had crossed into Albania as political refugees following the Serb crackdown on Kosovo. 
These Kosovars, with the assistance of their émigré community in Western Europe, purchased 
hundreds of Albanian state-run businesses, which were then used as front companies for illicit 
merchandise storage and money laundering.30 However, these claims have not been 
substantiated. 
In the course of the 1999 conflict, the KLA-related criminal structures found another source of 
income: smuggling of refugees to Western Europe, in cooperation with Albanian organized 
criminal groups and Italian mafia. Trafficking in persons was also reported. Local men were 
said to be preying on girls in refugee camps, posing as aid workers or “recruiting” the girls to 
be “teachers in Italy.” The abducted girls were being smuggled to Greece or Italy where they 
were forced into prostitution.31 
When the Yugoslav forces departed from Kosovo in June 1999, they left behind a temporary 
vacuum in authority. Organized criminal groups, which consolidated in the course of the 
conflict, took advantage of this situation before the new law enforcement and justice systems 
were established to further strengthen themselves and extend their control in the territory. 
Trafficking in drugs seems to have remained one of the main activities of criminal gangs in the 
post-conflict Kosovo. An important factor that continues to facilitate drug trafficking through 
Kosovo is its geographic location on the “Balkan route”, which leads from poppy cultivation 
area in Southwest Asia through Iran and Turkey, and then splitting into two on the Balkan 
Peninsula, with one branch passing by sea through Turkey and Greece and the other through 
Macedonia, Albania, Kosovo, Serbia and Bosnia. Another factor fuelling crime in Kosovo has 
been the low level of economic activity in the province due to the destruction of industries by 
the war. This has resulted in high unemployment rate,32 creating a pool of people willing to 
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take part in illegal activities. The unresolved status of Kosovo, which remains part of Serbia 
until its final status is determined, has also contributed to the problem, due to weak border 
control between Kosovo and Serbia.33 
However, in the post-conflict Kosovo, trafficking in drugs is no longer linked to illicit 
transborder trade in small arms and light weapons. The latter is rather minor, at least 
compared to arms trade in the neighboring Balkan states, or to other illegal activities in 
Kosovo, and amounts to tens or occasionally hundreds of guns. The low level of trade is due to 
several factors, one being the fact that the market for arms is relatively saturated, as there are 
about 330,000 to 460,000 civilian small arms already in Kosovo. Apart from security providers, 
such as UNMIK police and KFOR, and categories of businesses/citizens holding “weapons 
authorization cards” (including private security firms and some politicians), these arms are 
owned by organized and semi-organized criminal actors, businessmen and ex-combatants. The 
existing demand comes mainly from these actors who regularly upgrade their equipment. 
Weapons are also owned by ordinary civilians: approximately 60-70 percent of households in 
Kosovo possess guns, mainly for their own security. Another factor that accounts for the low 
level of trafficking in arms is the fact that trafficking of women, cigarettes or fuel are less risky 
and more lucrative enterprises. The presence of international and national security forces may 
also be a factor.34 
In spite of low levels of trafficking in arms, the 2005 Kosovo Progress Report of the European 
Union identifies arm trafficking through Kosovo as a matter of growing concern,35 possibly as 
supply of arms could be provided to terrorist groups or insurgencies abroad. 
Mass smuggling of goods has also been a matter of concern in the post-conflict Kosovo, as the 
channels established before the conflict for the purpose of arms smuggling have been 
expanded to include other goods (cigarettes, alcohol and petroleum products).36 Other types of 
fraud exist in the province, for instance activities involving the infringement of copyright laws37 
and the production of counterfeit Euro banknotes. Europol Crime Report lists Kosovo as one of 
the places where counterfeit Euro banknotes are being produced.38 
Trafficking in human beings seems to remain widespread in post-conflict Kosovo. It is mostly 
related to sexual exploitation, while other forms of trafficking, such as forced labor or removal 
of organs, have not been detected. According to the International Organization for Migration 
Kosovo, the main causes of trafficking in human beings are unemployment, poverty, gender 
inequalities, social and cultural attitudes, and the demand for sexual services and cheap 
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labor.39 The province is used as a transit as well as a destination area. Although the presence 
of international military forces initially played an important role in the development of this 
illegal activity, up to 90 percent of clients of sex services are currently domestic.40 
The proceeds of illegal activities are reportedly being laundered by organized criminal groups 
in the area and abroad. In 2003, a former commander of the KFOR, Lieutenant General Fabio 
Mini, expressed a belief that “there is no other place in Europe where money laundering is as 
easy as in Kosovo or the Balkans in general.”41 
In 2004, basic legal framework to control money laundering in Kosovo was established with 
the promulgation of UNMIK Regulation 2004/2 on the deterrence of money laundering and 
related criminal offences (amended in February 2005). Under this law, financial institutions are 
required to identify their clients and report any suspicious transaction. Kosovo’s Financial 
Information Centre, established in September 2004, is responsible for gathering and analyzing 
data on money laundering. 
However, not much has changed in practice, as the enforcement of the legislation represents a 
tremendous challenge. According to the EC’s Kosovo Progress Report, dirty money is laundered 
through legitimate businesses, which are often owned by the chiefs of drug trafficking groups 
based in Kosovo. These groups reportedly also invest their funds abroad.42 There are anecdotal 
reports on the restaurants’ role in money laundering. Money is reportedly also being laundered 
through the privatization of state-owned enterprises43 and the illegal construction industry, 
which is blooming in Kosovo and is reportedly largely dominated by organized criminal groups. 
Transborder organized criminal networks do not operate in a vacuum, but generally work hand 
in hand with government officials. The spreading of organized crime in Southeast Europe was 
therefore concomitant with the growth and institutionalization of corruption.44 
In post-conflict Kosovo, corruption seems to be a serious problem. A citizens’ perception 
survey, carried out jointly by Kosovo’s Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (PISG) and 
UNDP Kosovo, has revealed that 80 percent of Kosovars consider corruption to be a problem in 
their everyday life. The institutions perceived as most corrupt are Kosovo Energy Corporation 
(KEK), hospitals and Kosovo Customs. Perceptions of corruption are also relatively high for 
central government institutions (the Kosovo Government, the Kosovo Presidency and the 
Assembly of Kosovo) and municipal government. Reported corruption in these institutions, 
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however, is significantly lower than perceived.45 This could indicate either that corruption is 
not as pervasive as perceived, or that although corruption does exist, the majority of the 
population does not report victimization. Transparency International 2004 Annual Report 
similarly indicates that perception of corruption in Kosovo is high for utilities and 
business/private sector (3.1 on a scale where one indicates the lowest level of corruption and 
five the highest). Political parties (3.0), the legal system/judiciary (2.9) and registry and permit 
services (2.8) are also listed among the most corrupt institutions.46 According to the 
International Crisis Group report of February 2006, corruption in Kosovo seems to be growing 
both at central and municipal levels. It appears that the mentality of the communist era when 
the government controlled the distribution of resources remains, and cronyism dominates 
selection processes for the new boards of public utilities and regulatory boards.47 What is 
encouraging, however, is that the majority of Kosovars view their police, the Kosovo Police 
Service (KPS) as a trusted and credible institution. As expected, this is true only for the Kosovo 
Albanian community, whereas the minority Kosovo Serb community, generally mistrustful of 
the Kosovan institutions, demonstrate a low level of confidence in the KPS.48 
In its 2005 enlargement strategy paper, the European Commission characterizes corruption in 
Kosovo as “widespread.”49 The EC/Council of Europe’s Situation report on Organized and 
Economic Crime in South-Eastern Europe links crime (“smuggling, tax and custom evasion and 
other kinds of crime”) with corruption in the public sector, characterizing it as a “threat to 
Kosovo society.”50 While the available quantitative data do not indicate to what extent the 
corruption is indeed related to the activities of organized crime, there is abundant anecdotal 
evidence making this connection. 
It appears that the abovementioned illegal activities are dominated by the same group of 
actors who seem to be organized geographically, with families/clans controlling all forms of 
illegal activities in a certain area. This would suggest that there exists a connection between 
the networks involved in various forms of trafficking in the province. For instance, it is very 
likely that trafficking in human beings is organized by the same organized criminal groups that 
were involved in the smuggling of arms, drugs and refugees before and during the war. They 
are allegedly using the same routes as before as well as the same collaborators across the 
border and seem to be in many instances linked to the KLA, with close ties with the local 
political elites. 51 
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Kosovan organized criminal groups allegedly work in tandem with ethnic Albanians in Albania, 
Macedonia and abroad.52 In its 2004 report on organized crime, Europol listed ethnic Albanian 
organized criminal groups from Albania, Kosovo and Macedonia as an increasing threat to 
European Union Member States.53 
Allegations also exist of links between the KLA and terrorist organizations. In 1998, the US 
State Department put the KLA on their list of terrorist organizations, noting that it was funded 
through international heroin trade and loans from Islamic countries and personalities, 
allegedly including Osama bin Laden.54 There were also allegations that Al Qaeda operatives 
were fighting alongside the KLA in Kosovo from 1998 to 1999 and were present in Northern 
Albania in KLA training camps, and claims that Balkan organized criminal groups served as a 
conduit for Al Qaeda’s financial operations.55 However, these allegations have not been 
substantiated. 
3.2 International Efforts to Counter Organized Crime in Kosovo56 
Resolution 1244 establishing UNMIK and KFOR did not give them a direct mandate to fight 
against organized crime. This was captured under the task to establish the rule of law. 
Upon its deployment, KFOR, mandated to ensure public safety and order in Kosovo, made a 
number of arrests to restore law and order in the province. UNMIK, for its part, focused on 
maintaining civil law and order, in addition to meeting the immediate humanitarian objectives, 
as per its mandate. This involved establishing local police forces and deploying international 
police personnel, as well as restoring the key tasks of the Kosovo judiciary. It established 
independent judicial commissions, composed of local and international legal experts, which 
selected judges and prosecutors; created a legal assistance sector; put in place legal and 
judicial training programmes to build the capacity of the depleted judicial sector; and 
established a basic legal framework, as the previous one did not form an adequate legal basis 
for the creation of an independent and effective judiciary. The UN brought international judges 
into the domestic legal system, which was an important measure that helped strengthen the 
 
______________________ 
52  Situation Report on Organized and Economic Crime in South-eastern Europe, EC/Council of Europe.  
53  2004 European Union Organized Crime Report, Europol, December 2004. 
54  Mutschke.  
55  “Understanding Balkan Organized Crime: A Key to Success in Iraq?,” An Interview with Mark Edmond Clark, 
The Strategy Group, July 2003.  
56  There are a number of international actors involved in bringing sustainable peace to Kosovo, including the 
United Nations, the NATO, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the European Union. A 
thorough examination of their actions to combat organized crime in Kosovo was not the objective of this 
research, as it would require a study in itself. However, it was deemed necessary that this paper offers at least 
some brief overview of this topic. The author of this paper does not claim that this overview is comprehensive. 
  Kosovo 
  15 
 
 
 
local judiciary. The international staff was instrumental in dealing with sensitive cases, in 
which domestic judges would be subject to too much pressure.57 
Although the fight against organized crime per se was not among UNMIK’s main priorities at 
the time of its creation, it emerged as such in the course of 2002 with the establishment of the 
Kosovo Organized Crime Bureau (KOCB). André Heinrichs, former Head of the Bureau, outlined 
in 2003 the overall strategy of UNMIK in the area of organized crime as consisting of four 
elements: the reform of applicable law, as appropriate; capacity building of the police in order 
to strengthen investigative techniques, leading to arrests and convictions; cooperation with 
other law enforcement agencies; and integration of the Kosovo Police Service (KPS) into the 
fight against organized crime.58 
UNMIK’s KOCB was in November 2004 integrated into the Department of Organized Crime, 
which also includes the Trafficking in Human Beings Investigation Section (THBS) and the 
Narcotics Investigation Section (NIS), and is, among other tasks, preparing the KPS for an 
eventual hand-over of responsibilities. 
In 2003, following the revelation of gross mismanagement, including the possibility of fraud 
and corruption in Kosovo’s public utilities, an Office of Anticorruption was established within 
UNMIK, under the direct supervision of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General. 
The objective of the office is to achieve reform of corporate governance and management 
practices within public utilities, promote the establishment of an appropriate regulatory 
environment governing public utilities, identify fraudulent behavior and take appropriate 
action – administrative or criminal – in relation to those involved.59 
The Office investigates all transactions done in public companies in Kosovo (PTK post and 
communications, KEK electricity, Airport and Railways), and its Head sits on the Boards of 
Directors of publicly owned enterprises as an observer. It monitors internal processes in these 
enterprises to detect instances of corruption and mismanagement, particularly in procurement, 
finance and recruitment, and works closely with UNMIK Police and Justice. Any suspicious 
activity is then investigated by the mission’s Financial Investigations Unit. The Office has 
already helped achieve major management reforms, which has led to increased revenues, 
reduced procurement costs and better investment practices.60 
Today, UNMIK is extraordinary among peace missions in that it has a dedicated capacity to 
counter organized crime. In addition, its mandate is special in that the mission plays a role of 
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an interim administration, which allows it to take on a wide range of responsibilities, in 
cooperation with Provisional Institutions of Self-Government. 
3.3 The Impact of Organized Crime on Peacebuilding in Kosovo 
Organized crime, politics and society 
In Kosovo, political instability and war that followed NATO intervention in 1999, with the 
accompanying absence of law and order, created immense opportunities in which organized 
crime could flourish. It created a market in which various groups would come together, no 
matter their ethnicity, and cooperate in the pursuit of profits. The war helped further the 
expansion of organized crime also by creating a mentality in which liberation fighters, many of 
whom were also drug lords, were considered national heroes who had played an essential role 
in the struggle for independence.61 Their popular support made them enjoy a sort of immunity 
from persecution. Organized crime, which was spreading almost unhindered, seems to have 
gradually come to exert great influence over political, economic and social life in Kosovo. 
The former KLA structures have split, with some members turning to politics and others to 
business, organized crime, or paramilitary activities. These elements, however, have remained 
closely intertwined. The criminal network in Kosovo is said to be composed of clans – the so-
called “15 families” – with their chiefs either part of the leadership of the former KLA, or 
directly connected to it.62 
Political elites seem to have been directly involved in illegal business. An example of such 
involvement is smuggling through Blace, the border crossing post between Kosovo and 
Macedonia. In an attempt to curb this activity, the Head of the Customs Service replaced 
several customs officers, which led to a 40 percent increase in revenues from that post.  
However, soon he began to receive death threats and was allegedly pressured by the 
Democratic Party of Kosovo to reinstate the dismissed officers.63 
Intimidation and violence are pervasive in Kosovo public life, with the main target being key 
officials in the government and judicial system. In 2000, the Director of the Municipal 
Department of Planning, Reconstruction and Development was murdered in Pristina after he 
attempted to curb illegal construction in Kosovo. The main suspects in his assassination were 
the criminal elements connected with illegal construction industry.64 The interference of 
criminal groups with politics is evident in the high turnover of Kosovars in senior positions of 
customs services. Political life in Kosovo is generally very violent, with a great number of 
political murders occurring.65 
 
______________________ 
61  Interview with UNMIK/OSCE official, March 2006. 
62  Khakee and Florquin, pp. 7-8; Hajdinjak, p. 27. 
63  Kosovo: A Strategy for Economic Development, International Crisis Group Balkans Report no. 123, 
Pristina/Brussels, December 2001, p. 8. 
64  Ibid., p. 7.  
65  Khakee and Florquin, pp. 8, 21. 
  Kosovo 
  17 
 
 
 
Justice system officials and witnesses are particularly exposed to pressure. The Secretary-
General in his report covering the period from May to December 2005 assessed that there was 
an increase in the intimidation of justice system staff.66 In December 2005, the Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General for Kosovo reported that in one municipality, all 
Kosovan judges pulled out of a case after they had received threats. Two witnesses reported 
having received threats in a murder and a terrorism case, and one witness in war crimes case 
was murdered.67 
Organized criminal groups seem to also have played a role in fomenting ethnic tensions. 
Criminal actors may often be behind what appears to be ethnically motivated crime, either in 
an effort to create tensions and breed disorder, or to solve a dispute between themselves. 
Organized criminal groups may have played a role in the conflict that erupted in Macedonia in 
2001, and may have contributed to the organization of March 2004 riots in Mitrovica which 
developed into a widespread campaign by Kosovo Albanian extremists against Serb, Roma and 
Ashkali communities of Kosovo.68 Criminal elements, in particular former KLA groupings, may 
also have compelled ethnic Albanians in February 2003 to participate in demonstrations 
against the turning in to the Hague tribunal of ethnic Albanians accused of war crimes.69 
However, while some organized criminal groups choose to fund extremism, others prefer to 
fund local infrastructure and social services.70 
Over time, close interrelationship has developed between criminal and political elements, 
which in some cases have overlapped substantially. The political groups were initially 
dependent on the trade in illegal commodities to finance their “liberation struggle” but later 
this trade became a source of continuing personal enrichment. The criminal groups, on their 
part, have depended on political protection to continue with their operations. This has created 
a symbiosis of organized crime and politics, a dangerous mixture hindering development and 
sustainable peace.  
How organized crime has hindered peacebuilding 
One of the main challenges facing Kosovo on its way to sustainable peace is building 
functioning institutions, capable of providing for the needs of the people. 
However, institution-building has been severely hampered by the activities of organized crime. 
Organized criminal groups have a twofold approach. On the one hand, they aim at gaining full 
control over the state apparatus through attempts to dominate certain key sectors. On the 
other hand, they have a vested interest in keeping the status of lawlessness, which allows 
them to operate unhindered, and in preventing effective institution-building from taking place. 
One of the most vulnerable sectors is judiciary. Criminals have continuously attempted to 
control the justice system through intimidation of officials and witnesses, thereby damaging a 
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transparent, independent and efficient functioning of justice institutions and hindering the 
establishment of the rule of law.  
Organized criminal groups have also come to exert great influence over the province’s 
economy. On the one hand, they have contributed to creating an insecure environment, 
turning away potential investors. On the other hand, criminal actors, able to act as investors 
themselves, have assumed an important role in the Kosovo businesses sector. 
Smuggling of goods and other type of fraud involving tax and customs evasion has had a 
negative impact on the socio-economic situation as it has caused a loss of public revenues, 
which could have been used for development. Draining of public resources has contributed to 
the growing gap between the rich and the poor, and has undermined public trust in 
governance and law enforcement institutions. 
Organized criminal groups have been engaged in gross violations of human rights, the most 
prominent among them being assassinations, including political assassinations, and trafficking 
in human beings. High levels of violence in everyday life have prompted the population to take 
measures to ensure their personal security, often through the possession of guns, and the 
proliferation of weapons has contributed to a propitious environment for conflicts. The 
insecurity, among other factors, has also impeded the return of displaced persons. 
Organized criminal groups have hampered institution-building by having furthered widespread 
corruption. Corruption has been allegedly pervasive in nearly all institutions, from central and 
municipal government, to judicial institutions, customs and immigration, service-providing 
institutions, the Parliament and the Presidency. Corruption has represented a serious obstacle 
to peacebuilding, as it has prevented a transparent functioning of institutions and has 
diminished public confidence in these institutions, thereby undermining their legitimacy and 
creating a potential for instability.71 
Money laundering has allowed illegal actors to appear legal, thus making them legitimate 
participants in the high echelons of the society. Opportunities for money laundering may have 
also attracted criminals and terrorist groups from abroad. 
The interests of terrorist and organized criminal groups converge in their drive for profits and 
the fact that they both thrive in disorder. Therefore, they both have an interest in preventing 
the establishment of the rule of law and democratic governance. In Kosovo, there were reports 
of cooperation between terrorist groups and organized crime. These kinds of alliances can 
have devastating consequences, not only locally but also worldwide. 
The interest of organized crime in breeding tensions and disorder has manifested itself in the 
role organized criminal groups played in fuelling ethnic hostilities. Paradoxically, they have 
cooperated freely and successfully across ethnic lines. Inter-ethnic tensions have had a direct 
impact on the functioning of the multi-ethnic institutions, which are the key to peace in the 
province. 
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Criminal groups’ funding of local development and social services has also been detrimental to 
peacebuilding. Criminal groups have in this way gained the support of the local communities 
while undermining the weak, nascent public institutions – and the authority of the state – by 
taking on their role. The social recognition of criminals as national heroes, a mentality, which 
has persisted after the conflict, has been detrimental to the establishment of sustainable peace 
as it has supported the existence of criminal elements in the society and has hindered the fight 
against them. The fight against organized crime cannot be successful without active 
participation of the population at the grass-roots level. 
Kosovo has undoubtedly made great progress in the past years, with the assistance of the 
international community. Public institutions were developed and are being strengthened, the 
rule of law is taking root and the security sector is becoming increasingly accountable. 
However, numerous challenges remain in political, economic and social areas, including 
unemployment and inter-ethnic tensions. Combating organized crime is certainly one of these 
challenges. 
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4 Liberia 
4.1 Evolution of Criminal Patterns from 1997 to early 2006 
Background 
Liberia has a turbulent past. Years of civil war shattered the Liberian society, with thousands 
of killed and displaced, the unemployment rate at 85 percent and absolute and extreme 
poverty at 76.2 and 52 percent respectively.72 Throughout the years, the country suffered from 
different forms of organized crime. Individuals and groups took advantage of their privileged 
position in society to enrich themselves and developed well-formed structures and networks 
towards this end. The expansion of these networks was tightly linked with the opportunities 
that presented themselves through conflict. 
The civil war in Liberia started in 1989 and involved government forces and fighters of an 
opposition group, the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), led by a former government 
official, Charles Taylor. International involvement in the resolution of the conflict was 
extensive. At the beginning of the conflict, it was a subregional organization, the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) supported by the UN, which took the lead in 
efforts to reach a peaceful settlement. ECOWAS established in 1990 an observer force, the 
Military Observer Group (ECOMOG), while the UN Security Council in 1992 imposed an arms 
embargo on the country. In 1993, ECOWAS brokered the Cotonou peace agreement and the 
Security Council established the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL), tasked 
to support ECOMOG in the implementation of the Cotonou peace agreement.73 In 1997 
Charles Taylor was elected president at the UN-observed elections. 
UNOMIL’s mandate was completed with the successful conduct of the elections and the UN 
established UNOL, the first UN peacebuilding support office ever. Its main task was to help 
consolidate peace following the elections. However, Taylor’s election did not bring peace to 
the country. On the contrary, his brutal regime, characterized by human rights abuses and 
harassment of political opponents, faced in 1999 a rebellion which led to another civil war. 
Liberia was under an extensive sanctions regime. In 2001, the Security Council replaced the 
arms embargo imposed in 1992 with a more comprehensive one, due to Liberia’s role in 
fuelling the conflict in Sierra Leone.74 The embargo restricted trade in arms, diamonds and the 
travel of individuals believed to be representing a threat to regional peace. In 2003, the 
Council extended the sanctions regime to include the timber industry.75 The same year, the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone indicted President Taylor for crimes against humanity. 
On 18 August 2003, a comprehensive peace agreement was signed in Accra between the 
Government and the rebel forces, Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) 
and the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL). Under intense international pressure, 
President Taylor resigned and went into exile in Nigeria. His Vice-President Moses Blah took 
over the presidency for two months until the newly established National Transitional 
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72  For this and other socio-economic indicators, see The 2006 Liberia National Human Development Report, 
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73  Security Council Resolution, S/RES/866 (1993), 22 September 1993.  
74  Security Council Resolution, S/RES/1343 (2001), 7 March 2001. 
75  Security Council Resolution, S/RES/1478 (2003), 6 May 2003. 
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Government of Liberia (NTGL) was sworn in in October 2003. The NTGL was headed by 
transitional Chairman Gyde Bryant and composed of the former Government of Liberia, LURD 
and MODEL factions. The main task of the NTGL was to prepare for fair and peaceful
democratic elections. The mandate of UNOL was terminated and the UN established a 
multidimensional stabilization force, the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), to support 
the NTGL and assist in the implementation of the agreement.76 The force, which took over 
peacekeeping duties from ECOWAS forces, comprised political, military, civilian police, criminal 
justice, civil affairs, human rights, gender, child protection, disarmament, demobilization and 
reintegration, public information and later, electoral components. 
However, the linkage between natural resources and arms proliferation remained after Taylor’s 
departure and continued to fuel conflict in West Africa. The Security Council in 2004 renewed 
the sanctions until this link was broken and the Comprehensive Peace Agreement was fully 
implemented.77  
The elections in October 2005 and subsequent installation of the new democratically elected 
government of Liberia marked the beginning of a new era. The new president-elect, Ellen 
Johnson-Sirleaf, took office in January 2006. She established a Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission to address crimes committed during the later stages of Liberia’s civil war, vowed 
to fight corruption, and requested the extradition of Charles Taylor from Nigeria to face 
charges for crimes against humanity. 
Activities of organized criminal groups from 1997 to early 200678 
The most important form of organized crime under the presidency of Charles Taylor was 
trafficking in arms in exchange for natural resources, in particular diamonds and timber. This 
link was clearly documented in December 2000 in the Report of the Panel of Experts 
established in relation to Sierra Leone. In the report, the Panel noted that diamonds were a 
primary income source through which the rebel Revolutionary United Front (RUF) had 
sustained its military activities. It established that the trade was conducted primarily through 
Liberia, with the involvement of Liberian government officials at the highest level, in particular 
President Charles Taylor and businessmen close to his inner circle. The Panel found 
overwhelming evidence that Liberia had been supporting the RUF through provision of 
training, weapons and related materiel, and discovered supply lines to Liberia through Burkina 
Faso, with the weaponry coming mainly from Eastern Europe. The report also revealed that the 
Liberian aviation registry had been used extensively for weapons imports into its own territory 
and into Sierra Leone, with the assistance of Burkina Faso.79 The findings of the Panel were 
followed by the Security Council’s imposition of a more comprehensive embargo on Liberia, 
involving a ban on arms, diamonds and travel of key individuals.80 
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76  Security Council Resolution, S/RES/1509 (2003), 19 September 2003.  
77  Security Council Resolution, S/RES/1579 (2004), 21 December 2004. 
78  Liberia is party to the UN Convention on Transnational Organized Crime with the supplementing protocols, and 
the UN Convention Against Corruption.  
79  Report of the Panel of Experts, S/2000/1195, December 2000. 
80  Security Council Resolution, S/RES/1343, 7 March 2001. 
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On 29 March 2001, the Secretary-General appointed a Panel of Experts concerning Liberia in 
order to investigate violations of the newly imposed sanctions. The Panel was also to collect 
information on Liberia’s compliance with the demands to cease its support to the RUF, expel 
the members of the RUF from its territory and cease importing diamonds from Sierra Leone. 
Further, the Panel was to collect information on illegal activities of individuals referred to in 
the report of the Panel of Experts on Sierra Leone (1306 (2000)), as well as to further examine
the link between the exploitation of natural resources, other forms of economic activity in 
Liberia and the fuelling of conflict in Sierra Leone and neighboring countries.81  
Diamonds had a strategic value in the conflict for the different warring factions. The Panel 
found evidence of President Taylor’s dealings in connection with the sale of RUF diamonds via 
Monrovia until at least early 2001. The imposition of sanctions led to a marked decline in the 
misuse of the Liberian label for diamond smuggling, with few diamonds passing from Sierra 
Leone through Liberia. In 2002, the Panel assessed that the embargo on diamonds had been 
effective in that “Liberian”-labeled rough diamonds disappeared from official markets. At the 
same time, it documented a shift in trade patterns, with the Liberian rough diamonds being 
smuggled out of the country into neighboring certification schemes. Although the amount of 
such diamonds decreased in the course of 2002, probably due to the conflict and the resulting 
cut in diamond production, Liberian diamonds continued to reach international markets. In 
2003, LURD forces were found to be seeking to occupy key diamond mining areas in order to 
generate income for war through diamond production, which reconfirmed the importance of 
the diamonds for the continuation of the conflict.82 
Following the imposition of the ban on diamonds, other sources of revenue such as trade in 
timber and revenues from Liberia’s maritime and corporate registry came to the fore as the 
main sources of funds for the procurement of arms for the Liberian government.  
Timber was an important source of revenue for Taylor’s regime since his coming to power in 
1997. In its report in October 2001, the Panel of Experts on Liberia revealed that timber 
production, which was under personal control of the President, was an important source of 
revenue for sanction-busting. It documented cases in which timber companies were directly 
involved in the violation of sanctions. For instance, the Panel found evidence of a Singapore-
based mother company of Oriental Timber Company, a company that was running important 
timber operations in Liberia, arranging for payments for arms shipments. Of particular concern 
was the concession of the Liberian logging company SLC along the border with Sierra Leone, 
an area where an old military base of the Liberian Armed Forces was located. This area, 
controlled by the son of President Taylor, was used to stockpile RUF weapons and served as an 
entry point for the RUF to Liberia. The Panel found ample evidence demonstrating that the 
relationship between Liberia and the RUF had continued.83  
 
 
______________________ 
81  Letter Dated 23 March 2001 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council, 
S/2001/268, 23 March 2001. 
82  See the following Reports of the Panel of Experts: S/2002/470, 19 April 2002, p. 25; S/2001/1015, 26 October 
2000; S/2002/470, April 2002; S/2002/1115, 25 October 2002; S/2003/973, October 2003; and S/2003/498, April 
2003. 
83  Reports of the Panel of Experts S/2003/779, 7 August 2003, p. 11; and S/2001/1015, October 2001.  
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In 2002, Global Witness, an NGO investigating links between natural resources exploitation, 
conflict and human rights abuses, estimated that the Liberian logging industry was the most 
important income source funding the flow of illicit weapons to Liberia. Furthermore, it 
documented numerous human rights abuses performed by logging companies, which 
maintained their own militias. Among those were arbitrary arrests and detentions at the 
barracks operated by the logging companies, humiliation and torture as a means of 
intimidation and retribution, sexual exploitation and other abuses. Some logging companies 
were also recruiting and arming former combatants, mainly from the former NPFL, and 
building private militias some of which took part in military operations. Global Witness also 
found that taxes from the logging industry were paid directly to the Executive Mansion Special
Projects Accounts, which was under the direct control of Taylor. These revenues allowed him 
to maintain his brutal Anti-Terrorist Unit (ATU) and the Special Operations Division (SOD), 
which were involved in numerous human rights abuses.84 In May 2002, United States 
congressional leaders accused President Taylor of ties with organized crime and called for a 
ban on Liberian timber, claiming that foreign logging companies were enriching Taylor and 
through him, the RUF, thereby fuelling the regional instability.85 The Security Council finally 
imposed timber sanctions on Liberia in May 2003.86  
In 2001, the Panel also found irregularities in the accounts of the maritime and corporate 
registry. It documented how the Bureau of Maritime Affairs and its agent, the Liberian 
International Shipping and Corporate Registry, were used to fund arms and transportation, in 
violation of the sanctions.87  
With the escalation of the conflict in 2003, President Taylor openly stated that Liberia had 
ordered arms for the purpose of self-defense. At the same time, the Panel of Experts found 
that his Government was using a network of foreign banks to conceal extra-budgetary income 
and expenditure, which had become the main source of funding for defense purposes.88  
Trafficking in persons was also widespread during Taylor’s regime. This illegal activity is 
common in West Africa and occurs in several ways. It can take the form of forced labor, such 
as agricultural slavery or work for armed movements, or the form of trafficking for the purpose 
of prostitution and sexual slavery.89 
Before 2003, Liberia was an important source and destination country for the trafficking of 
men, women and children. The victims were exploited for both forced labor and sexual 
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84  Logging Off: How the Liberian Timber Industry Fuels Liberia’s Humanitarian Disaster and Threatens Sierra Leone, 
A Report by Global Witness, September 2002, pp. 7, 9-10; Taylor-made: The Pivotal Role of Liberia’s Forests and 
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Transport Workers Federation (ITF), September 2001. 
85  United States, House of Representatives Subcommittee on Africa, Elections in Sierra Leone: A Step Toward 
Regional Stability?, Washington DC, 16 May 2002 (transcript of hearing), available at: 
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86  Security Council Resolution, S/RES/1478 (2003), 6 May 2003, para. 17 (a). 
87  Report of the Panel of Experts, S/2001/1015, October 2001.  
88  Report of the Panel of Experts, S/2003/498, 24 April 2003. 
89  UNODC, Transnational Organized Crime in the West African Region, New York: United Nations, 2005, pp. 25-27. 
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purposes. A widespread form of trafficking in persons was forced recruitment of mercenaries, 
including of children. Some 15,000 child soldiers were reported to have been recruited into 
government militias and armed non-State actors. Children were used as fighters, often 
drugged before the combat; as porters or laborers charged with looting from the civilian 
population; or as sexual slaves. Forced mining of gold and diamonds, organized by various 
armed groups, also took place during the conflict.90 
Liberian citizens lived in a state of fear from the ongoing forced recruitment and other abuses 
such as maltreatment by armed groups, looting and extortion. Both Government units and 
LURD factions were involved. Refugee camps in Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea and Ghana were a 
constant source of mercenaries for all of the warring parties. For example, Nicla, a camp in 
western Côte d’Ivoire, provided Liberian refugees for recruitment into Lima, a militia in Côte 
d’Ivoire, and possibly into MODEL. The refugees were terrorized by “people with guns” who 
entered the camp at night. Those who opposed recruitment were harassed and subject to 
violence. This practice had started in December 2002 and was taking place on a daily basis. In 
Guinea, children were a particularly vulnerable target for recruitment by LURD and 
disappearances were reported in June 2002. Refugees in Ghana reported that there were 
attempts by the Liberian government to recruit combatants in March and June 2003.91  
Corruption was widespread throughout the years of President Taylor’s rule. The Panel of 
Experts on Liberia found that there were large diversions of revenues and assets from the 
Government of Liberia, carried out by President Charles Taylor in partnership with his circle of 
trusted individuals. All of Liberia’s high profit industries were under his direct control. In timber 
industry, one of the prime sources of government revenues, tax evasion by logging companies 
and corruption were widespread. President Taylor established a system in which the logging 
industry became dominated by a few mega concessions. He was personally involved in the 
allocation of concessions.92 According to the Global Witness research, the timber industry in 
Liberia was worth at least US$ 187 million in revenues in 2000, but only an estimated US$ 6.7 
million was deposited into the national budget.93 In 2003, the Panel of Experts estimated that 
sanctions imposed on timber would surely result in the loss of government revenue, but they 
would also cause the loss of taxes and bribes in the amount of $20 million, which the Panel 
assumed would have ended in the pockets of government officials.94 
Taylor, his Minister of Lands, Mines and Energy and other associates also allegedly benefited 
through the privatization of exploitation of other natural resources, such as gold, diamonds 
and iron ore.95 In 2003, Global Witness reported that Taylor also continued to purchase large 
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95  Report of the Panel of Experts, S/2003/973, October 2003. 
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amounts of Sierra Leonean diamonds smuggled into Liberia. The money from these 
transactions was deposited in foreign accounts.96 
Revenues from the maritime and corporate registry, which is assessed to have been providing 
in 2001 about 25 percent of government revenue, were used for opaque off-budget spending. 
The Panel of Experts found evidence of diversion of funds and their investment in real estate 
through corporations controlled by Taylor. Following his resignation, he allegedly tried to sell 
some of these properties from his exile in Nigeria. Other examples include Taylor’s 
misappropriation of almost all the money paid into the National Social Security and Welfare 
Corporation, and his request to the Central Bank of Liberia in June 2003 for the issuance of a 
line of credit of US$ 700,000. The Panel found strong indications that he took this money into 
exile in Nigeria. Taylor also gained a number of financial benefits through fuel importation, the 
cost of which was borne by the Liberian people who were paying an excessive price for the 
fuel. He also pocketed large profits through rice importation in a similar way.97 
Laundering of proceeds of illegal activities took place on a large scale by Liberian officials 
during the government of Charles Taylor. In order to conceal extra-budgetary income and 
expenditure, the Taylor government used a network of foreign banks where large amounts of 
money of dubious origin were deposited. In 2002, in spite of the dire humanitarian situation in 
the country, Liberian assets in Swiss banks were allegedly higher than those from South Africa 
and Nigeria. The Liberian accounts for which public records are available represented 25 
percent of all such African funds in Swiss banks. However, Liberia itself has not developed into 
a major money laundering centre, possibly due to the lack of well-developed financial 
system.98 
Taylor allegedly also maintained links with terrorist organizations. Global Witness reports that 
Al Qaeda had been buying diamonds since 1993, probably in order to shift its assets from bank 
accounts to this valuable and untraceable commodity, thereby avoiding surveillance by 
financial authorities.99  
Al Qaeda allegedly derived millions of dollars from its dealings with the RUF, with the 
assistance of the Liberian government. According to reports, small packets of diamonds were 
smuggled by RUF commanders from Sierra Leone to Liberia where they were exchanged for 
cash, in a location protected by the Liberian government. Reportedly, Al Qaeda operatives 
visited Monrovia several times from 1998 to 2001 and were at some point even renting a 
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house there. Taylor allegedly received a commission on every transaction that took place in 
Monrovia.100  
An upsurge in diamond dealings by Al Qaeda was noted especially in the months prior to 
September 11 attacks on the United States, when the organization anticipated the attacks 
would lead to stricter financial assets controls. Deals in diamonds carried out during this time 
reportedly amounted to US $20 million.101  
While NGO and press reports on the dealings of terrorist groups in Liberia during the period 
under review are numerous, and while such dealings indeed could have taken place, there is 
no evidence which could positively confirm this link.  
Following the end of the Taylor regime, trafficking in arms ceased, with the last shipment of 
arms intercepted at Robertsfield International Airport in August 2003. On the other hand, the 
small-scale trading in arms intensified with arms and ammunition being smuggled to Liberia 
from neighboring countries in order to be surrendered to the disarmament, demobilization, 
rehabilitation and reintegration process (December 2003-October 2004).102 However, as there 
is no evidence of the involvement of organized criminal groups in the small arms trade in West 
Africa in general,103 there also is no indication that these groups would be involved in the 
cross-border movement of weapons for the purpose of “selling” them to the weapons 
collection programmes.  
Trafficking in persons continued under the NTGL. There were continuing reports of the various 
factions recruiting combatants, including children, to fight in Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea and Sierra 
Leone, and girls continued to be trafficked in and out of Liberia for the purpose of sexual 
exploitation. In addition, following the deployment of UNMIL in 2003, there were reports 
about Ukrainian and Moroccan women being trafficked to Liberia for the purpose of 
prostitution. In May 2004, several Moroccan, Russian, Ukrainian and Filipino women, found in 
a nightclub in Monrovia, were determined to be victims of sexual exploitation.104 
The NTGL was comprised of former militia members, some of whom were involved in 
trafficking in persons during the conflict, using them as forced laborers, fighters and sexual 
slaves. As the involvement of some of them in human trafficking continued after the end of the 
civil war, with clubs employing trafficked women reportedly under their patronage, the NTGL 
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did not take any action to counter trafficking in persons. UNMIL civilian police and trafficking 
units played an important role in deterring the conduct of these practices.105  
The practice of diversion of government revenues and corruption also continued after 
President Taylor’s resignation. Under the short presidency of Moses Blah, massive stealing, 
looting and extraction of pay-offs were allegedly performed at all levels of the government and 
by members of LURD and MODEL, with the knowledge or direct involvement of their leaders. 
Once NTGL took control, financial irregularities persisted. The Panel of Experts documented 
that in July 2004 the NTGL borrowed US$3 million from the Central Bank of Liberia but did not 
make any disclosure about the transaction. Unapproved excess spending was accompanied by 
significant leakage of revenue in custom duties, taxation on petroleum imports and sale of iron 
ore. Financial abuse included unsubstantiated travel, questionable tax exemptions, selective 
payments to creditors, unjustified payments to officials and payments to contractors for 
services that were never received, among others.106 
In June 2005, the Panel of Experts asserted that the NTGL’s financial administration system 
was weak, with no internal control and an inadequate external oversight system. 
Misappropriation of government revenues continued and large leaks of revenues, in particular 
from the import of rice and petroleum products, were documented. This practice followed the 
pattern established under the rule of Charles Taylor and was performed by top government 
officials and businessmen who had close ties with the previous regime.107 Some local state 
officials were also reportedly involved in the illegal sale of diamond mining permits.108 The 
ECOWAS report on economic crime in Liberia, publicly released in July 2006, recommended the 
immediate dismissal of four senior officials in NTGL for misappropriation and mismanagement 
of public funds.109 
Top government officials in the NTGL reportedly continued to provide funds to Taylor after his 
resignation via various intermediaries.110 Pointing to Taylor’s continuing influence in the sub-
region, the Secretary-General in his June 2005 report stated that “Charles Taylor is reportedly 
in regular contact with his former business, military and political associates in Liberia and is 
suspected of sponsoring a variety of presidential candidates with a view to ensuring that the 
next Liberian Government will include his sympathizers.”111 
Corruption was pervasive also in the Liberian judicial system. There was little or no punitive 
action for corrupt behavior and in a number of cases officials remained in high positions 
despite evidence of their wrongdoing. The lack of skilled lawyers which was due to poor 
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salaries and high risks involved with the job, contributed to the appalling state of the judicial 
system. No improvement in governance was recorded in the last report of the Panel of Experts 
in December 2005 before the new government of Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf took over.112  
The scope of corruption in Liberia was such that several observers called for a forceful 
approach, with the international community assuming the responsibility for the management 
of public finances in Liberia.113 Other types of criminal activities are also present in West Africa. 
One of them is the trade in narcotics, for which West Africa has increasingly been emerging as 
a transit point.114 Drug trafficking was present in Liberia and may have, according to the 2003 
Report of the International Narcotics Control Board, represented one of the sources of income 
for the procurement of arms and ammunition, used by rebel groups and criminal 
organizations.115 Liberians reportedly also worked with Nigerian and Ghanaian drug cartels 
and used Sierra Leone for transshipment. Cigarette smuggling, financial fraud such as 
advance-fee and internet fraud, forgery, arms manufacturing and armed robbery were also 
recorded in the West African region.116 However, little data is available for Liberia.  
As shown above, the Government of President Taylor was involved in several forms of 
transnational organized crime, some of which are documented in the reports of the UN Panel 
of Experts established by the Security Council, and NGOs’ reports. These activities continued 
well after the resignation of Charles Taylor, under the NTGL. This was possible as the law 
enforcement and judicial systems were entirely manipulated by those in power and therefore 
were neither able nor willing to take any action to stop the looting of the country’s coffers and 
other criminal activities. 
In addition to the organized crime performed by high-level government officials, the 
population also took part in illegal activities, mainly as a survival strategy.117 
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4.2 International Efforts to Counter Organized Crime in Liberia118 
The international community took various measures to combat organized crime in Liberia.  
First, Liberia was subject to a comprehensive sanctions regime aimed at combating illegal 
trade in arms and natural resources. Overall, sanctions were only partially effective: the ban 
imposed on diamonds was being violated and the ban on timber allegedly as well. 
Nevertheless, the sanctions did reduce the revenue available to the former President Taylor 
and to LURD and MODEL for the purchase of arms and maintenance of mercenaries. Thus, they 
contributed to the erosion of President Taylor’s power base, while at the same time preventing 
the former warring factions from using diamonds and timber to fuel the war.119  
The record of the sanctions’ impact on the humanitarian situation is also mixed. The sanctions 
certainly contributed to the loss of revenues for the government and jobs for the population, as 
well as to the image of Liberia as an international outcast. However, they were not the sole 
culprit for such a situation, as claimed by the Liberian government who was using their 
negative impact as a pretext for the lack of reform and improvement in services. The 
depreciation of the Liberian dollar and the lack of donor interest for projects in Liberia were a 
result of poor governance, economic mismanagement and the armed conflict as much as the 
result of the sanctions. On a more positive note, the loss of revenues and jobs associated with 
the sanctions was allegedly also accompanied by important losses in taxes and bribes, which 
would otherwise likely have benefited government officials and promoted corruption. 
Sanctions also forced certain logging companies allegedly responsible for serious human rights 
violations to cease their operations in Liberia, thereby contributing to a decrease in human 
rights abuses.120 
Second, efforts were made to restore the rule of law through building of law enforcement and 
justice sector institutions. This began in earnest with the arrival of UNMIL in 2003. In 
particular, UNOL, established following the 1997 elections and mandated to help consolidate 
peace in Liberia after the July 1997 elections, comprised a small office that did not have either 
the mandate or the capacity to effectively address institution-building in the area of the rule of 
law. UNMIL’s mandate, on the contrary, involved many aspects that are, directly or indirectly, 
part of the fight against organized crime. This includes support for security sector reform, in 
particular assistance in restructuring of the police force; assistance in developing a strategy to 
consolidate governmental institutions, including judicial and correctional institutions; and help 
to restore proper administration of natural resources. 
When UNMIL deployed, it had to begin building everything from scratch. Government 
buildings were looted during the battle of June-July 2003 and not much was left in the 
ministries and the legislative assembly. There was no public administration that could deliver 
 
______________________ 
118  A thorough examination of the actions of international actors to combat organized crime in Liberia would 
require a study in itself. The author of this paper does not claim that the brief overview offered in this section 
is comprehensive. 
119  See also Report of the Panel of Experts, S/2004/396, June 2004. 
120  See Reports of the Panel of Experts: S/2002/470, April 2002; S/2004/396, June 2004; S/2002/1115, October 
2002; S/2003/779, August 2003; and S/2005/360, June 2005. 
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basic services and the security sector was in a dire need of reform, after being manipulated by 
successive abusive regimes.121  
With UNMIL’s help, progress was made in strengthening national legal, judicial and 
correctional institutions as well as in the restructuring of the Liberian National Police. Liberia’s 
disarmament and demobilization programme was completed in November 2004. However, 
diversion of government revenues and corruption, including in the justice sector, continued on 
a large scale. When the government of President Johnson-Sirleaf took over, the police, 
judiciary and justice system remained fragile and underdeveloped. Much more robust 
measures had to be taken to successfully restore the rule of law in the country.122 
In early 2005, EC-financed financial audits of the Central Bank of Liberia and five state-owned 
enterprises (the Bureau of Maritime Affairs, the National Port Authority, Robertsfield 
International Airport, Liberia Petroleum Refining Company and the Forestry Development 
Authority) revealed the catastrophic scope of corruption in Liberia.123 These audits catalyzed 
the drive to address Liberian corruption, which culminated in the establishment of the 
Governance and Economic Management Programme (GEMAP).124 
GEMAP, a robust action plan, signed on 9 September 2005 by the NTGL and Liberia’s 
international partners (the UN, the World Bank, the EC/EU, the International Monetary Fund, 
Ghana, Nigeria, the US, ECOWAS and the African Union), is an innovative measure that aims 
to address serious corruption and mismanagement in the area of public finances. It comprises 
aggressive external oversight mechanisms directly targeting the management of public 
finances, including revenue collection, expenditure controls and government procurement and 
concession practices. This includes the placement of international experts with co-signature 
authority in selected ministries, agencies and state-owned enterprises; international 
management contracts for selected institutions; an international administrator in the Central 
Bank; the establishment of Anti-Corruption Commission with full prosecutorial powers; and 
provision of international legal experts as advisors to Liberian judiciary. The Economic 
Governance Steering Committee (EGSC), which includes the government members, 
international  partners and  also  a representative of  civil society, oversees its implementation. 
The programme came about after a complex and lengthy negotiation process which had to 
overcome several hurdles. These included the reluctance of the NTGL to allow foreign experts 
to have influence over the financial management of the country, and their unwillingness to 
tackle corruption due to the involvement of NTGL members in corrupt practices. In particular, 
GEMAP not only jeopardized their profitable businesses, but also threatened them with 
possible judicial prosecution. Among the factors that accounted for the signing of the 
Programme was the fact that the NTGL was outgoing, as well as strong outside pressure 
 
______________________ 
121  Rebuilding Liberia: Prospects and Perils, International Crisis Group, Africa Report No. 75, 30 January 2004, p. 
15. 
122  Tenth Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Liberia, S/2006/159, 14 
March 2006. 
123  Report of the Panel of Experts, S/2005/745, December 2005, p. 8. 
124  See Governance and Economic Management Assistance Programme (GEMAP) and its three annexes.  
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exerted on Chairman Bryant, including specific threats of withdrawal of foreign assistance.125 
The Security Council on 19 September 2005 welcomed the signing of GEMAP, requested the 
Secretary-General to regularly update it on the progress in its implementation and explicitly 
linked this progress to the lifting of the sanctions.126 The new Liberian government of President 
Johnson-Sirleaf gave its full support to the implementation of GEMAP. In her inaugural address 
on 16 January 2006, the new President included economic governance reforms among the key 
priorities of her government, vowed to fiercely fight corruption and stated that all high officials 
would be required to declare their personal assets.127 She took immediate steps to enhance 
transparency in economic management of the country, ordering, among other issues, that all 
political appointees of the NTGL resign, requesting an audit of the NTGL, and declaring all 
forestry concessions granted to timber companies under the previous administration, as null 
and void.128  
Finally, at the level of the population, measures to prevent unemployment and help the people 
find sustainable livelihoods have been important in reducing the spreading of organized crime. 
This includes reintegration and rehabilitation of the former combatants (RR), the currently 
ongoing final phase of the disarmament and demobilization programme carried out by UNMIL. 
The RR component, a joint initiative of the UN Development Programme, UNMIL, the 
Government of Liberia, NGOs and a number of international agencies aims at assisting 
demobilized former combatants in becoming productive members of society.129 
4.3 The Impact of Organized Crime on Peacebuilding in Liberia 
Organized crime, politics and war 
Criminal activities linked to war, in particular trade in arms and natural resources, together 
with widespread corruption, can be characterized as the main criminal activity that flourished 
in Liberia in the period under review. In addition, the instability in the country coupled with the 
lack of the rule of law, created propitious conditions for other forms of crime to develop and 
consolidate. Opportunities for illegal business and the general lawlessness attracted 
international criminals and allegedly also terrorist organizations, which reportedly established 
links in the region. This allowed criminal syndicates to further entrench themselves in the 
economies and politics of the West African region. 
Taylor’s insurgency in Liberia in 1989 as well as civil war in the neighboring Sierra Leone 
blurred the lines between organized crime and politics, furthering the spreading and 
consolidation of organized crime under the cover of political objectives. Political actors became 
motivated primarily by financial gain, which in turn began to be the main motor driving the 
war and the spreading of organized crime. 
 
______________________ 
125  For details on the negotiating process, see Liberia’s Governance and Economic Management Assistance 
Programme (GEMAP), a joint review by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations’ Peacekeeping Best 
Practices Section and the World Bank’s Fragile States Group, April 2006.  
126  Security Council Resolution, S/RES/1626 (2005), 19 September 2005. 
127  President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf’s inaugural address, 16 January 2006. 
128  Tenth Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Liberia, March 2006, p. 2. 
129  See UNDP Liberia, at: http://www.lr.undp.org/ddrr.htm. 
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During Taylor’s rule and under his patronage, Liberia allegedly hosted all kind of international 
criminal enterprises. Arms dealers and diamond merchants, including those linked to terrorist 
organizations, reportedly operated side by side and were guaranteed unhindered operations by 
the Government of Liberia. They benefited from the state support and infrastructure while 
having access to valuable commodities such as diamonds and timber. Taylor’s control over the 
state apparatus, his links with criminal and possibly terrorist groups, and his regional and 
international networks of partners contributed to the consolidation and expansion of his 
criminal empire.130 His rule could easily be considered an extreme case of intertwining between 
organized crime and politics.  
Criminal empires, once established, are hard to dismantle, and criminalized political actors are 
hard to remove from the scene. Liberia, characterized by US Library of Congress as a country 
with reputation for being “a center of government corruption and high-volume trafficking in 
arms, diamonds, and timber,”131 offered an attractive base for such criminal activities even 
after the resignation of Charles Taylor. The members of the NTGL continued to authorize the 
pillaging of the country’s resources in exchange for personal gain, thus continuing with the 
corrupt practices at the highest levels. 
The situation in Liberia required at different times morally questionable compromise with 
political interlocutors with dubious past. Warlords were present in Liberian politics throughout 
the period examined in this paper. When Charles Taylor was elected President in 1997, there 
was no doubt about his past human rights abuses and his destabilizing role in the region. 
Nevertheless, the people of Liberia elected him president and the international community had 
to treat him as a statesman. After his departure, warlords remained on the political scene, with 
the NTGL largely made up of former militia members.  
The dilemma of dealing with war criminals and other actors responsible for serious violations 
of human rights, which is often faced by the international community, was very real in the case 
of Liberia. Several observers questioned whether dealing with these compromised personalities 
was indeed necessary, a discussion which enters into the debate on peace versus justice.132 
They also expressed concern over the fact that the October 2005 elections brought to power 
some former warlords responsible for serious human rights violations who could obstruct 
efforts by the Liberian government to build durable peace.133 However, there is little the 
international community could do, without contradicting itself, when compromised 
personalities come to power through elections. In particular, the promotion of democracy 
sometimes goes against the very values the international community is trying to promote.
 
______________________ 
130  For more on Taylor’s alleged alliances, see Stephen Ellis, The Mask of Anarchy: The Destruction of Liberia and 
the Religious Dimension of an African Civil War, New York: New York University Press, 2001, pp. 70-74; Farah, 
“Liberia: The Diamonds of Terror”; William Reno, Warlord Politics and African States, Boulder, Colorado: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, Inc, 1998, pp. 81, 94-99. 
131  The Library of Congress, Nations Hospitable to Organized Crime and Terrorism, A Report Prepared by the 
Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, under an Interagency Agreement with the United States 
Government, October 2003, p. 30. 
132  The main argument in this debate is whether justice should sometimes be sacrificed for the sake of peace or 
not.  
133  Report of the Panel of Experts, S/2005/745, December 2005; An Architecture of Instability: How the critical link 
between natural resources and conflict remains unbroken, Global Witness, December 2005; Ellis, “How to 
Rebuild Africa.” 
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Nevertheless, even if justice sometimes is sacrificed for peace in the short term, in the long run 
both peace and justice should prevail, leading to the establishment of durable, sustainable 
peace. An important step in this direction was in the case of Liberia the request by the new 
Liberian Government for Taylor’s extradition from his exile and his handing over to the 
international justice. 
Finally, it is important to distinguish between organized crime performed by high-level 
government officials, and organized crime in which part of the population is taking part 
without finding it morally questionable. In fact, it is social and economic conditions, in 
particular high levels of unemployment, that compel the population to engage in illegal 
activities. While still illegal, popular engagement in criminality as a survival strategy carries 
less moral onus than the self-enrichment of political elites at the public expense. 
How organized crime hindered peacebuilding 
The corrupt system established by the former President Taylor continued under the NTGL. For 
many officials in the NTGL and former combatants, the incentives to be involved in illegal and 
corrupt practices were far more lucrative and therefore attractive then the incentives to work 
towards peace and democracy. This prevented any real changes in the management of the 
country from taking place.  
The economic governance sector, in particular the management of public funds and natural 
resources, was an area where corruption was rife under the rule of Taylor as well as the NTGL. 
Improper administration of natural resources and diversion of state revenues contributed to a 
depletion of the country’s coffers, thereby depriving it of revenues necessary for the 
establishment of basic social, health and educational services, essential for national 
reconstruction and economic recovery. Rampant illegal exploitation of diamonds, gold and 
rubber diverted the revenues that could have been used to improve the living conditions of 
ordinary Liberians. All this hampered efforts to rebuild economy and contributed to persisting 
poverty and unemployment. A vicious circle was created in which organized crime promoted 
poverty, which in turn contributed to the spreading of crime by driving the population to take 
part in illegal activities. The involvement of the very elites in illegal activities prevented the 
authorities from taking action against criminal offenders, which led to the absence of any 
judicial and criminal accountability. The weak and manipulated law enforcement and judicial 
systems allowed for further spreading of the culture of corruption and impunity.  
Corruption and mismanagement also led to years of sanctions on the exploitation of natural 
resources, which hampered the country’s ability for recovery. The lack of transparency in 
governance deterred donor support and created a negative image of the country, turning away 
investors. It also represented a serious security challenge as groups involved in illegal 
exploitation of resources could use their profits to engage in conflict, destabilizing either 
Liberia or the neighboring countries. 
The ruling elites involved in illegal activities can easily be characterized as “organized criminal 
groups” as they worked in concert, supporting one another, in the pursuit of material gain, 
and their actions were usually transnational in nature. These elites ruled the country and 
dominated the key institutions, from revenue-generating agencies, to state administration, the 
judiciary and the central bank, leading to a total absence of democratic governance. The new 
Liberian government is facing numerous challenges, including addressing organized crime and 
economic mismanagement. The former elites whose privileges are being taken away through 
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the government’s measures to enhance transparency in governance could be one of the 
potentially destabilizing factors. The improvement of the living conditions and economic 
prospects of the population will also be crucial for preventing the spreading of organized crime 
and building of sustainable peace. 
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5 Conclusions and Recommendations 
The two cases are different in terms of geography, history and the challenges to which they 
were exposed. Liberia is an independent sovereign country whereas Kosovo is a province that 
is part of another state, with its future status still to be determined. Liberia has abundant 
natural resources, from diamond, timber to rubber etc., whereas Kosovo only possesses much 
less valuable, although also important, lignite reserves. The main activities of organized 
criminal groups in each of the cases also vary: in Kosovo, the main activities were trafficking in 
drugs and human beings, and smuggling of goods, whereas in Liberia, trade in natural 
resources in exchange for arms, and corruption with links to organized crime, were prevalent.  
However, the two cases share several similarities. Both in Kosovo and Liberia, organized crime 
was interrelated with armed conflict before, during and after the conflict. In Kosovo, organized 
crime prepared the ground for the conflict by enabling one of the sides to take up its armed 
struggle. However, the organized crime not only persisted into the post-conflict phase but also 
expanded and consolidated, thereby representing a serious obstacle to peacebuilding. In 
Liberia, the warring factions were also largely funded through illegal activities, in particular the 
exploitation of natural resources. Once the faction of Charles Taylor came to power, it 
captured not only the natural resources sector, but also the revenue-generating agencies. The 
state was then run as a private enterprise, dedicated to the goal of personal enrichment of the 
elite. In both cases, political instability and war created immense opportunities in which 
organized crime could thrive, due to the lawlessness and the involvement of the elites in 
lucrative illicit businesses.  
Organized crime in both cases represented a threat to democratic institutions whose 
independent functioning is central to peacebuilding. It impeded the establishment and the 
strengthening of key government institutions by its interference into political affairs, social and 
economic policy and by furthering corrupt practices. It hampered the independent functioning 
of justice institutions and the establishment of the rule of law, through intimidation and 
pressure exerted on the main actors in the criminal justice system.  
Organized crime also represented an obstacle to the growth of the local economy as illegal 
activities caused a loss of public revenues, which could have been used for development. Even 
worse, in Liberia, the ruling elite was allegedly responsible for diversion of the state revenues, 
depleting the coffers for the purpose of personal gain, and leaving the population in poverty. 
Organized crime also took advantage of the social crisis for recruitment purposes. Finally, in 
addition to the impact organized crime had domestically, it also threatened regional and 
global peace and security through its alleged links with terrorism.  
Due to its abundant reserves of natural resources, Liberia was exposed to an additional 
challenge of the management of natural resources. The history and recent events have shown 
that countries rich in natural resources may be more prone to conflict than those who do not 
have them. The argument that greed, not grievance, is at the core of civil wars in cases where 
countries are endowed with natural resources, may in part apply to Liberia.134 In particular, 
greed was probably an important motivation for war. However, overall it was likely a mixture 
of both the struggle for power and for control over resources, which come with political 
 
______________________ 
134  For the argument on “greed and grievance”, see Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, Greed and Grievance in Civil 
War, October 2001.  
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domination. In Kosovo, the element of organized crime, present in the province long before the 
conflict, linked up with political elements that needed illegal channels to take up their 
struggle. In both cases, financial gains of political actors were an important motivation which 
fuelled instability and the spreading of organized crime. Warlords came to dominate political
life, and the intertwining of political elites with organized crime seriously undermined the 
prospects for durable peace. Organized crime in both cases constituted a major threat to 
peacebuilding. In Kosovo, the technical assessment of progress in implementation of the 
standards for Kosovo states that “serious and organized crime, financial and economic crime, 
including corruption, money-laundering and trafficking continue in Kosovo as across the 
region” and recognizes that responding effectively to these challenges represents “an ongoing 
challenge to UNMIK and the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government.”135 However, in the 
case of Liberia, the activities reviewed in this paper are usually not called “organized crime”, 
probably as they were performed, among other actors, by a democratically elected Head of 
State and the ruling elite. Nevertheless, their impact on peacebuilding was probably even more 
devastating as there had been no authority fighting against them. The fight against organized 
crime in Liberia could only begin after the change in the government had taken place. 
Complicity in the expansion of organized crime was widespread in both cases: from 
government officials to Western business interests and powerful banking networks. In the case 
of Kosovo, many alleged the international community was partly responsible for the growth of 
organized crime as it tolerated or even tacitly supported illicit activity. Some raised questions 
about how ethical it is for the West’s foreign policy to back a guerilla army party financed by 
organized crime.136 Similarly, in the case of Liberia, the United States was criticized for turning 
a blind eye to Taylor’s trade in diamonds before a diamond ban was imposed on Liberia.137 The 
question, however, goes beyond the morality of collaborating with criminals, as it raises 
pragmatic problems. In particular, peace built on such foundations may not be viable in the 
long run as the development/expansion and consolidation of criminal networks will negatively 
affect the post-conflict environment. Secondly, once these networks are fully in place, they 
may be difficult to uproot, and the international community may have to deal with political 
leaders rising from the criminal network itself. It may also possibly have to face a rise of 
criminality in their own societies as a result of the spreading of organized crime.  
The above analysis leaves us with some sobering lessons. First, little can be done against 
organized crime if there is no political will on the part of the main protagonists in the 
international community to do so. Second, even if the political will is there, the international 
community has little leverage to deal with organized crime when performed at the highest, 
state level, particularly if those in power were democratically elected. Government 
participation in the fight against organized crime is crucially important. And finally, even if 
government participation is secured, efforts to counter organized crime cannot guarantee that 
it will be entirely uprooted, due to its complexity and the involvement of many different actors 
and interests in these powerful, complex networks. What is clear, however, is that the fight 
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against organized crime has the most chances to succeed if it begins as early as possible, 
before the criminal networks had the opportunity to become firmly entrenched in the society. 
The following sections offer a review of tools to fight against organized crime that were used 
in the two cases and could possibly be replicated in other situations, and some 
recommendations. 
5.1 Some Tools to Fight against Organized Crime 
The rule of law 
Strengthening of the rule of law is an essential tool in the fight against organized crime. 
Measures to strengthen the rule of law are crucial to avoid a vacuum in authority following the 
conflict, in which organized crime can develop unhindered. Neither UNMIK nor UNMIL were 
directly mandated to fight against organized crime. However, their mandates contained 
important tasks in the area of the rule of law.  
Capacity within the field mission  
Although not directly mandated to fight against organized crime, UNMIK later developed a 
dedicated capacity to deal with organized crime such as drug trafficking, trafficking in human 
beings and financial fraud. This is unprecedented among the field missions and plays an 
important role in deterring different kinds of illegal activities.  
Sanctions 
Sanctions may in some cases be effective, either to pressure states into anti-corruption/crime 
activities, or by targeting criminals and their support structures in the government directly. 
Liberia was subject to extensive sanctions regime due to its involvement in the fomenting of 
unrest in the sub-region. The sanctions reduced the revenue available to the warring factions 
for the purchase of arms and maintenance of mercenaries, and thus contributed to combating 
organized crime in the country and the sub-region. However, when this tool is used, possible 
negative impact on the humanitarian situation should be carefully studied and measures to 
offset it should be developed.  
International oversight 
Liberia, which was suffering from large-scale state-sponsored corruption and diversion of 
government revenues, agreed to an innovative measure, the GEMAP, which involves 
international oversight over state revenues, expenditures, procurement and granting of 
concessions. GEMAP is an unprecedented programme, outstanding in its scope – managing 
revenue, expenditure and government procurement and concession practices – and in the fact 
that it managed to balance the need for radical action with the concerns of state sovereignty. 
It may not be easily replicated in other situations as very specific conditions need to be in place 
for such a complex, comprehensive and aggressive strategy to be negotiated. However, the 
possibility of establishing such external oversight systems needs to be kept on the list of 
possible options in combating organized crime and corruption.  
Panels of experts  
The case of Liberia demonstrated that the establishment of the panels of experts can prove 
useful, as collecting information on illegal activities and making it public contributes to better 
knowledge about criminal networks. 
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Support for sustainable livelihoods 
The case of Liberia also showed that the measures to help the population – especially the 
former combatants – find sustainable livelihoods, are crucial in preventing the population from 
turning to organized crime as a survival strategy. 
5.2 Recommendations 
• Recognize the need to fight organized crime early in the process. The fight against 
organized crime has to begin before or during the conflict, and not only afterwards 
when criminal structures have already taken firm root. Measures to combat organized 
crime should be built into the work of all the actors in conflict prevention, conflict 
management, peacemaking and post-conflict peacebuilding.  
• More attention should be devoted to developing strategies to combat organized crime 
in conflict and post-conflict situations. It would be essential to look into ways to 
reduce the opportunities for making profit out of conflict. Legal activities should be 
more attractive than illegal, which could be achieved through positive incentives 
(donor support for projects etc.) and negative incentives (tougher measures imposed 
on crime offenders). Aid could also be dependent on the state’s commitment to crack 
down on organized crime.  
• “Mapping exercises” should be conducted jointly by the UN system and outside 
partners, involving an analysis of illegal markets, including demand and supply, the 
ways in which these markets operate, who are the main actors and how these markets 
could be disrupted.  
• Civil society should be supported through education, seminars and workshops and 
engaged in the fight against organized crime. This would create trust between law 
enforcement agencies and the public, leading to better reporting by the population to 
the police of information related to organized crime. 
• Organized crime should become a target of peacebuilding. The Peacebuilding 
Commission should pay particular attention to the post-conflict societies’ vulnerability 
to organized crime. 
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